The contradictions inherent in the concept of symmetry in Michael Walzer's counter-intervention theory: a case study of the Yemeni conflic

Abstract

Counter-interventions have often been employed to promote specific political or economic interests. Using the morality of counter-intervention as a lens, this article explores Michael Walzer’s counter-intervention theory to interrogate the practicalities of applying his symmetry principle—equivalence when balancing a conflict—in the context of imperfect information. After examining the links between the principles of non-intervention and self-determination and identifying the main tenets of Walzer’s theory, this article demonstrates how the Yemeni conflict exemplifies the problematics of crafting a moral counter-intervention strategy. On the one hand, the longer a country waits to counter-intervene, the harder it becomes to calculate the effects of the previous intervention; on the other hand, the faster a country counter-intervenes, the less informed and symmetric the counter-intervention is likely to be. Consequently, this study concludes that Walzer’s symmetry principle does not successfully indicate when and how counter-intervention should develop.